Frequently Asked Questions

What are these experiments about?

Actually we do not want to be too specific about the setup and the goals of our experiments, as this could create bias in the data we collect. In general we test economic and psychological theories of behavior in markets, bargaining, decision making, etc. As a subject you should not care so much what we are going to do with the data. You should rather care about what the decisions you are going to make in our experiments mean to yourself.

One thing you can be sure of: There will be no deception! You can trust the rules which you receive from the experimenters. Also the payment will be made as announced in the beginning of each experiment.

What is the payoff range?

There is no general rule for payoffs, but in order to give you some clues:

• Payoff rules vary from experiment to experiment.
• Your personal payoff depends on your decisions within the experiment. Most often it also depends on what other subjects decide and sometimes there is also a random number generator involved.
• We are planning to run experiments regularly. Thus, we will pay sufficient amounts in order to keep a sufficient number of interested subjects.
• If possible, we will pay you right after the experiment in cash. In cases where we need to calculate results and payoffs first, you will be able to pick up your payoffs at the secretaries' office.

Can I make losses in the experiments?

In principle the answer is "yes". However, this is an unlikely event. In general our experiments are designed in a way to let subjects make profits, sometimes a lot, sometimes less. We try to stick to the following rules:

• In experiments where subjects can make losses we pay a show-up premium. This is just paid for being present. Potential losses incurred during the experiments can therefore be deducted from the show-up premium.
• If there is no show-up premium or it is not high enough to cover your losses, you are expected to cover the rest out of your pocket.
• In none of the experiments you are condemned to make losses. Even for those in the weakest strategic positions there will always be a strategy to avoid losses (i.e. to guarantee a payoff of zero plus show-up premium). Losses usually result from either very stupid or very risky decisions.

Since we are not interested in engaging in debates with subjects about losses, we try to avoid the situations that losses happen. However, we want the subjects to take the experiments seriously. Thus, we expect subjects to back their decisions also with their money.

Is the experiment only for UM students? Are other persons also eligible?

For the time being we address only UM students. If you do not belong to the UM you may ask the contact person whether you are eligible.

I registered for an experiment, but I am not able to come. What should I do?

If you are not able to come, please cancel your registration immediately. Most of our experiments require a fixed number of participants. We and your fellow students will not be amused if we have to cancel an experiment just because some of you do not show up. Once you register we take it for granted that you either show up or cancel in due time (24 hours before).

I was put in an unfair position. Thus, I did not earn any money. Is this normal?

99.9% of all strategic situations are asymmetric, maybe even more. Asymmetries result from different information, different power levels, different strategic possibilities and so on. Think for example of a relationship between a seller and a buyer or of a relationship between employer and employee. Even for the frequently cited prisoners' dilemma you will never find a complete symmetric setting in practice. There is always one prisoner a bit more guilty than the other. Consequently we are interested in asymmetric settings and will also conduct experiments where subjects will receive rather unequal amounts of money. In such cases we normally assign the roles of the subject in a random manner (e.g. by drawing cards). Given the interests we have this is the maximum fairness we can achieve.